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Emails from Lt. Josh Arthur
Initial Impressions from Baghdad
Saturday, November 25, 2006
All,
Greetings once again. By now you're probably starting to wonder just
what kind of shady "deployment" this is, what with my updates
and e-mails more often than even I expected. All the same, I thought you
might like to know what our part of Baghdad brings to mind so far.
My unit is working primarily in the neighborhoods of Khadra and Ameriyah.
Find Baghdad International Airport on a map, and we're in the first built-up
areas just to its east and northeast (in western Baghdad, on the whole;
the opposite side of the city from Sadr City). The area we operate in
is mostly Sunni - almost exclusively Sunni, in fact. The neighborhoods
were once somewhat more mixed, with perhaps as high as a 70/30 - Sunni/Shia
blend at one point. Particularly as a result of the recent sectarian violence
you've probably heard much about, though, Shias are either leaving the
area voluntarily or leaving this world vary INvoluntarily. The stories
in the media of sectarian violence are absolutely true, and they probably
aren't overstated, no matter what you're hearing. Don't think there are
armed militias waging pitched gunfights in the middle of the streets every
day; that's not the case (actually, it's rarely the case). By far the
most common situation to which we respond, though, is indeed the finding
of dead bodies in our area. In but a handful of patrols already, I've
come upon three. Two had been bound and/or blindfolded; the third had
been the victim of an alleged drive-by shooting that happened just moments
before (we arrived on scene as a result of our responding to the gunfire).
Nearly all of the bodies found are of Shia victims, and most bodies show
evidence of having been killed execution-style, with gunshots to the back
of the head and neck.
It's generally about as gruesome as it sounds; thank goodness we've
so far been spared the spate of beheadings that ravaged the area not long
before our arrival. But the manner of death isn't as important as the
motive, which in almost all cases is reprisal and intimidation, as best
we can tell. Bodies are left in conspicuous areas - in open fields near
mosques, on heavily trafficked corners, or simply in sites that have since
come to be known as places to expect to find bodies. Sometimes they're
there simply as a show of force or power; other times they're acts of
revenge for incidents perpetrated by the other sect. It's human tragedy
of a senseless and, I think to most of us, a basically incomprehensible
kind. As I said, this is far and away the most common incident of note
to which we respond or happen to encounter.
It's probably fair to say that Iraqis are targeting each other more
than they are American forces these days, though that's little consolation
to the families who are, without a doubt, still losing soldiers each day.
Even groups more committed to violence against the other religious sect
generally aren't exactly averse to taking out an American and killing
two birds with one stone. IEDs are the most common and, generally, the
most feared threat from the insurgents and Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF). AIF
are adaptable, they're smart, and though they may not have the most sophisticated
technology, they exploit what they have to its deadliest potential.
They watch American patrols and learn about our techniques and about
our vehicles; they study their effective attacks from the past; they analyze
their tactics and are constantly shifting them to try to stay one step
ahead of us. Interestingly, it's generally rare these days to find tactics
that are completely new, ; many AIF groups have simply begun to revert
to prior tricks from their grab-bag to see if they'll work now that we
expect something else (more often than not, they don't). We, of course,
have systems and techniques to defeat or avoid many IED attacks, and we're
finally getting ahead of AIF in some respects, but this is their home
and they'll probably always have an advantage. As I said, IEDs are probably
the most widely feared threat, mostly because of their unpredictability.
The only mitigating factor is that knowledge that an IED sizable enough
to destroy an up-armored HMMWV, let alone anything bigger, must be very
large indeed. Aggressive patrolling and a constant presence do a great
deal to diminish the threat.
The scarier if more localized fear is the emerging frequency of sniper
attacks. It's probably fair to say that the sniper has been a fear for
every soldier in every conflict who had a chance of encountering one.
They're able to hide, they're able to select their shot, and - most dangerously
- they can shoot! There's actually strong suspicion that some of the attacks
are being carried out by a Chechen mercenary of sorts; whether that's
founded is beyond me. But it's always a scary thought to think that someone,
somewhere, is waiting for you outside of your vehicle.
It's particularly difficult with infantrymen who, by their training,
feel more comfortable on the ground. It's what they see their role as,
and it's how leaders have been taught to employ them. Infantrymen have
no particular desire to stay cooped up in a vehicle for hours at a time
(though they do it without complaint, since they know it makes them safer).
The sniper threat is not the primary one; there are only so many snipers,
and there are only so many opportunities that lend themselves to a sniper
attack (avoiding those in the first place, of course, is the best way
to beat it). Still, it's on most guys' minds, and that's probably the
hoped-for effect overall by those coordinating the attacks. (More general
small arms fire, as opposed to precision sniper fire, is seen by soldiers
not so much as a threat but as an opportunity, interestingly enough. If
they're going to be dumb enough to shoot at us, the average soldier thinks,
well heck, at least we have the chance to shoot back!)
Now that I've gone and talked about nothing but the dangers of the
area, let me make clear that no soldier here (including me) feels like
he's in imminent danger every minute of every patrol. Certain areas may
make the hair on the back of your neck stand up, as may certain situations,
but it would be misleading to think soldiers leave the FOB every day with
paralyzing fear. It's unhealthy not to be wary, but most of the time it's
not even an issue. We obviously try to avoid situations that are patently
dangerous.
We do a large number of patrols in conjunction with different Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF). My platoon in particular works with a unit of the
National Police, one of three main security forces (the others are the
Iraqi Police, IP, and the Iraqi Army, IA). Of the three, the National
police is the most homegrown, least professional, and most poorly trained.
The sense I get is that of a citizens' militia of sorts; of regular joes
who have volunteered to be armed policemen. They wear an interesting variety
of military-inspired uniforms, and they have various personal weapons
ranging from inconspicuous, shabby sidearms to nickel-plated AK-47s. They
are a motley crew if ever I have seen one, without a doubt. They patrol
in pickup trucks with extra sheet metal welded onto the sides, with gunners
kind of standing up in the bed of the truck with a machine gun. It would
be a comedy of errors if their jobs weren't very deadly serious. I don't
mean that they are indispensably important; just that it would be wrong
to mock their contributions when they, too, are the target of many attacks.
As I said, the Iraqis dislike each other as much as they dislike us. The
NP and IA checkpoints are frequent targets of vehicle-borne IEDs, and
the volunteers are putting their lives on the line in doing a relatively
thankless job. At the NP level (not so much IA), corruption and the good
old boy system seem to the norm, according to everything we've learned
from the outgoing units. It's easy to view them as inferior because of
their dubious loyalty and mediocre ability, but their sacrifice is the
same.
The only other particularly notable thing about our entire area of
operations, I would say - and indeed, from what I understand, from all
of Baghdad, is the massive amount of trash. Everywhere. If you've never
seen the slums of a foreign country, I don't think you could possibly
imagine how absurd it is. Even run-down areas of American cities are nowhere
near - just nothing at all like - the littered streets of our areas. Parts
of our area are and/or were the locations of the homes of many senior
government officials under Saddam's regime; many professionals still inhabit
the area, and yet the place is still filthy. I can't think of a more descriptive
word to use. Medians are covered with trash; you literally cannot see
the dirt beneath for many dozens or hundreds of meters at a time, and
when you can it's usually because there's an intersection. The prior unit
took part in an operation that, among other things, cleaned up all the
trash in the neighborhood, and within just months it's all returned. It's
a mess, and it gives you the worrying impression that maybe we care more
about Iraq than its own citizens? I obviously can't make that statement
based solely on the amount of trash, but it seems to me an indicator of
a mindset that might not be the healthiest for progressive reform. Just
one man's opinion.
With that I'll take my leave, though, and bid you all farewell. I hope
your Thanksgiving was enjoyable; the dinner here was somewhat lackluster
(no mashed potatoes or cranberry sauce - on Thanksgiving!), but the effort
was commendable. I was happy just to eat after my patrol. But I hope you're
all well, and in case you don't hear from me for a few weeks, I'd be remiss
if I didn't offer those four very important final words before I go:
GO ARMY! BEAT NAVY!
Love to all,
Josh
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