The Uncertain Future of the Humanistic Educational Ideal


In the summer of 1974 the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies held a two-week conference on education, or, to be more particular and cite the phrase by which the conference was announced, on The Educated Person in the Contemporary World. It was planned that the first four meetings of the conference should address themselves to certain specific topics which bore upon the general subject and that the discussion at these meetings should be initiated by prepared papers. I was asked to deal with the question of what were the factors in contemporary society which worked for or against the likelihood that, in the late twentieth century, there would emerge an effectual ideal of education which would be integrally related to the humanistic educational traditions of the past. What follows is my effort to respond to this all too momentous question.

Partly for Socratic reasons, but chiefly because it is my actual belief, I shall take the view that at the present time in American society, there are few factors to be perceived, if any at all, which make it likely that within the next quarter-century there will be articulated in a convincing and effectual way an educational ideal that has a positive and significant connection with the humanistic educational traditions of the past. At the moment, it seems to me that the indications point the opposite way and urge upon us the conclusion that our society will tend increasingly to alienate itself from the humanistic educational ideal.

Yet, although I would argue the necessity of this conclusion from the evidence before us, I think it necessary to stipulate, as I have done, that the state of affairs to which I refer is one that exists "at the moment." I wish, that is, to express my sense of how readily the winds of American educational doctrine shift, and that they do so at the behest of all manner of circumstances which are hard to discern, let alone predict. It is true that as I look toward the future, it appears improbable that the present situation will change; I do not think that circumstances are likely to arise that will call into being an ideal of education closely and positively related to the humanistic educational traditions of the past. And by this prognostication I am saddened, the more so when I consider how very little time has gone by since the humanistic educational traditions of the past were invoked in the formulation of an educational theory that seemed to have established itself very firmly in our culture, winning at least the passive assent of the educated middle class and the general approval of the intellectual class, as well as the profound loyalty of some of the best elements of the academic profession. Yet I reflect that the authority of this admirable theory of education was won as swiftly and as unpredictably as it was lost: that this was possible restraints, in some small degree, the impulse of pessimism.

A Columbia man is perhaps in a particularly good position to comment on the impermanence of educational theory, especially of such theory as takes account of the traditional humanistic conceptions of what education properly is. The history of my university over most of the last hundred years might be told in terms of its alternations of attitude toward these conceptions, and perhaps it will
serve our purpose if we have before us a brief summary of its career of ceaseless backing and filling.

In 1889 the Columbia trustees deliberated over the expediency of abolishing Columbia College—that is to say, of doing away with the undergraduate school which was the original part of the rapidly proliferating institution and which was still its core. Because of the accelerating tendency of the College toward becoming a university (which it did last by statutory charter in 1896) the undergraduate school was increasingly referred to by the absurd phrase, "the College proper"; sometimes it was called the School of the Arts. The proposal to abolish the College proper had been made by the then president, Frederick Barnard. He wanted his institution to get on with its new commitment to scholarly and professional graduate education, which was being shaped more or less on the then much admired German model.

Had President Barnard succeeded in getting rid of the undergraduate college, it cannot be said that the loss to learning would have been a grievous one. And perhaps even the loss to education could not have been thought momentous. The College was a small, old-fashioned school, its curriculum limited to Latin, Greek, mathematics of an outmoded sort, a little metaphysics, a very little natural science. Looking back at it now, perhaps the best that can be said for it was that it was not committed to early professionalism and specialization.

In the event, Columbia College, the College proper, was not abolished. But it was kept under constant suspicion and constraint, and in 1902 Nicholas Murray Butler put forward in his presidential report his belief that "four years is too long a time to devote to the college course as now constituted, especially for students who are to remain in University residence as technical or professional students." And in his report of 1903, he proposed that a Columbia student be required to do only two years of college work before going on to a graduate school. In 1905 Butler was able to announce with pride that this "professional option," as it came to be called, had actually been made available to undergraduates. He summed up the meaning of the new arrangement in the following words: "The Faculty of Columbia College say that to prescribe graduation from a four year college as a sine qua non for the professional study of law, medicine, engineering, or teaching is not a good thing but a bad thing."

Why was it not a good thing but a bad thing? Butler was in no doubt about the answer. In those days what we call liberal education or, even more commonly nowadays, general education, often went under the name of "culture," and Butler said flatly that "any culture that is worthy of the name . . . will be increased, not diminished, by bringing to an end the idling and dawdling that now characterize so much of American higher education."

But, as I say, the winds of American educational doctrine are never steady. No sooner had "idling and dawdling" been brought under control by cutting down the number of college years through "professional option" than Butler began to wonder whether he quite liked the new efficiency after all. In his report of 1909 he offers dark reflections on what he now calls the "cult of the will," which, he says, "has gone far enough just now for the good of mankind." Suddenly it seems to him that young men are in too much of a hurry to become lawyers, doctors, engineers, and teachers, and he recalls nostalgically that the four-year undergraduate college did after all make possible what he no longer speaks of as "idling and dawdling," but, rather, as "the generous and reflective use of leisure." He is explicit in saying that it is not enough to be a lawyer, a doctor, an engineer, or a teacher; one must be something else in addition—a cultured man. We understand that he really wants to say that one ought to be a cultured gentleman, but he is canny enough to know that the time has already gone by when one might conjure with that word.

Butler's change of heart did not immediately revise the Columbia situation. But a decade later, after the First World War, for a variety of reasons which we must not take time to consider, "professional option" became much less popular than it had formerly been, and the "generous and reflective use of leisure" established itself as a
proper mode of life for the young men of Columbia College. It was John Erskine, a scholar of Renaissance English literature, who gave it its most effectual form by initiating what elsewhere came to be known as the Great Books Program; at Columbia, the Great Books were read in a rather exigent two-year course for juniors and seniors which was called General Honors and remembered with gratitude and pride by everyone who was permitted to take it. (Not the least attractive aspect of the course was what would nowadays be called its “format”—it was organized in groups of about fifteen; two instructors presided over the discussion and were under tacit obligation to express their own differences with each other; the groups met, with a touch of ceremoniousness, once a week, on Wednesday evening, presumably for two hours but usually for longer than that.) Erskine was not a person of the finest intellectual temper; he stood on the edge of flamboyance and at a distance from significant achievement in his undertakings as poet, novelist, musician, and critic. But he was genuinely committed to the idea of intelligence; he wrote an essay which was famous in its day, its whole substance lying perhaps in its title, “The Moral Obligation to Be Intelligent.” He believed that the best way to make oneself intelligent and thus to prepare oneself to function well as a citizen or as the practitioner of one of the professions was through a happy and intimate acquaintance with the great intellectual and artistic works of the past, books chiefly, but music and the visual arts as well.

Erskine put his mark on Columbia, and, indeed, on educational theory throughout the country. Mortimer Adler as a very young graduate student was one of the first teachers in that enchanting General Honors course that Erskine had devised, and the mention of his name will suggest the response to the Great Books idea at the University of Chicago and at St. John’s College and at the innumerable other schools that were led to believe, though of course with varying degrees of intensity, that the study of the pre-eminent works of the past, chiefly those in the humanities, with what this study implied of the development of the “whole man”—no one then thought of the necessity of saying the “whole person”—was the best possible direction that undergraduate education could take.

It is not my intention to review in anything like full detail the career of the ideal of general education in this country over the last half-century, an ideal which, as I have said, was consciously humanistic in its emphasis and which insisted in the traditional humanistic way that the best citizen is the person who has learned from the great minds and souls of the past how beautiful reason and virtue are and how difficult to attain. The purpose of my historical reference has been only to put us in mind of how recently it could be conceived that a traditionally humanistic education had a bearing upon contemporary American life and deserved to be given an honored place in it. I recall my experience as a college teacher through the Thirties, Forties, and Fifties as having been a peculiarly fortunate one: I inhabited an academic community which was informed by a sense not merely of scholarly, but of educational purpose, and which was devoted to making ever more cogent its conception of what a liberal and humane education consists in. I know how eager will be the impulse of many to match my experience at Columbia College with their own at their own places; it is indeed a striking and impressive circumstance that in our country in our time it has been possible for there to be so pertinacious a concern with questions of what is best for young minds to be engaged by, with how they may best be shaped through what they read—or look at or listen to—and think about. It was a Columbia colleague of mine who wrote the classic account of the part played in American society by its tendency to anti-intellectualism, but Richard Hofstadter knew that this made a paradox, that in American society there is also a strong, if complex, disposition to admire and sustain the life of knowledge and thought.

I speak of the Thirties, the Forties, and the Fifties. But by the Sixties, something had happened to reduce the zeal for such education as set store by its being general, and defined its purpose as being the cultivation of general intelligence in the young. For reasons which,
to my knowledge, have not yet been formulated, but which I cannot doubt to have been of great cultural moment, this concern lost its characteristic urgency. At Columbia College, the consciousness of this change in our educational ethos was made explicit when, in 1964, the dean of the College, David Truman, asked Daniel Bell to look into the state of general education in the College and report on it to the faculty. I shall not touch upon the substance of Bell's brilliant report, which was later published under the title of The Reforming of General Education. I wish only to commemorate as a sad and significant event in the culture of our time the response of the Columbia College faculty to the questions the report raised and sought to answer. From my long experience of the College, I can recall no meetings on an educational topic that were so poorly attended and so lacking in vivacity as those in which the report was considered. If I remember correctly, these meetings led to no action whatever, not even to the resolve to look further into the matter. Through some persuasion of the Zeitgeist, the majority of the faculty were no longer concerned with general education in the large and honorific meaning of the phrase.

Nothing could be further from my intention than to say that they had become cynical about their function as teachers. Actually, indeed, it was in some part the seriousness with which they took their teacherly function that led them to withdraw their interest from the large questions of educational theory; periodically the answers to these questions become platitudinous and boring, mere pious protestations, and at such times a teacher might naturally and rightly feel that he does most for his students not by speculating about what shape and disposition their minds ought eventually to have, but by simply pressing upon them the solid substance and the multitudinous precision of his own particular intellectual discipline. I think there can be no doubt, too, that the growing indifference to the ideals of general education was in some considerable part an aspect of the new mode of political anxiety that was manifesting itself at the time. The urgency of the problems, the sordidness of the problems, which pressed in upon us from the surrounding world made speculation on educational theory seem almost frivolous.

But no sooner have we taken note of how things stood in 1964 and in the years of violent disruption of university life that followed—in the brief compass of this paper I shall not dwell on the latter—than we have to observe that the doctrinal winds are shifting once more, that the feeling about general education is changing yet again: we perceive that in certain circles, the circumstances of which tend to enlarge themselves, general education is being represented as a subject of ultimate and urgent importance.

Among those who have a professional concern with education, there is now a strong inclination to make the humanities salient in the ideal curriculums they project. Of the three categories into which the American system of higher education divides all learning, we can scarcely fail to be aware that the physical sciences, in their relation to general education, have come to be regarded with at least ambivalence and perhaps in a more pejorative way than that; their own moral nature is thought of as at best highly problematical, and not much is expected of what they can do for the moral nature of those who study them. It is no less plain that there has been a marked diminution in the confidence that the social sciences commanded only a few years ago. But on all sides we witness a renewed commitment to the promise of the humanities. Of the three categories of learning, this is the one that lays least claim to immediate practicality, to being effectual in what we call problem-solving, yet among those who are prophetically concerned with education the feeling seems to grow, and to be affirmed in conference after conference, in seminar after seminar, that in the humanities is to be found the principle that must inform our educational enterprise, the principle that directs us to see to the development of the critical intelligence, of the critical moral intelligence, without which—so it is increasingly said—we shall perish, or at least painfully deteriorate.

I speak of our society as being at the present time animated by a renewed interest in the kind of higher education whose moral con-
tent will help us in the right ordering of social and political existence. This is the interest in and the conception of higher education that is entertained by the educated middle classes and made articulate by those among them—who have a professional concern with the process and goals of education and who are habituated to connect them with the welfare of society at large. But we can scarcely fail to be aware that this large, ultimate, and ideal concern is concomitant with, and possibly a remonstrative response to, an interest in higher education that has both a different source and a different purpose. What I refer to is the interest in higher education of people for whom its salient characteristic is that they have not had any of it.

Of the resentment that this deprivation arouses, we are nowadays all aware, but perhaps we know less particularly than we might what it is that the grievance entails. We all recognize that in our society higher education is the most dependable means of upward social mobility. Through it may be acquired the technical knowledge and the conceptual aptitude that make it possible for a person to enter the professions and to enjoy the economic-social advantages that the practice of them entails. It is a distressing aspect of the situation that many members of disadvantaged groups have come to think of education, not as the means of acquiring technical training or the preparation for technical training, but merely as a process of accreditation, with an economic-social end in view, which has no relation to actual academic achievement. How much this is ignorance and how much cynicism is perhaps not immediately relevant here.

But the grievance of those who have been debarred from higher education is not wholly understood if it is thought of as having reference to economic deprivation alone. Those who feel the grievance—or at least many of those who feel it—are not merely saying that because they have not had college educations they cannot make as much money as those who have. Nor are they quite talking about their unsatisfactory social status only in the simple way that associates it immediately and directly with income. Their grievance is so-

social in a more complex sense, in the sense that it is cultural. Its nature is vividly described in a book called The Hidden Injuries of Class, by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb. The senior author of this work proposes the idea that, although all enlightened people abundantly understand that the division of any society into classes implies that some classes as compared with others are disadvantaged or deprived or (to use the term proposed by the book’s title) injured, the range of the injuries extends further than is commonly supposed. The overt injuries of class are the short supply of goods, of sustenance, physical comfort, leisure, security, freedom from constraint, and so on. But there are other injuries of class of a less manifest kind: for example, Sennett suggests that increasingly members of the American urban working class feel themselves to be in an unsatisfactory relation to high culture. So that there will be no misapprehension of what Sennett means, I quote his strikingly explicit statement of the situation: “The changes in [the] lives [of these people] mean more to them than a chance, or a failure, to acquire middle-class things. For them, history is challenging them and their children to become ‘cultured,’ in the intellectual’s sense of that word, if they want to achieve respect in the new American terms; and toward that challenge they feel deeply ambivalent.”

Let us pass over the negative side of this ambivalence to consider only its positive component. These urban workers want to become educated persons; they believe that being educated is to their advantage. They do not exactly know why this is so, and Sennett, the professional observer and recorder of such desires and beliefs as they entertain, cannot say with any definiteness what the advantage might be. As I say, he rules out crass economic advantage and such social gains as follow directly from it. He seems to suggest that the desire to be educated is associated with the diminished force of the ethos of class, that the people who think it would be good for them and their children to be “cultured” feel that they have lost a class idiom and a class bond—they want to be “cultured” because they have been deprived of the community once provided by class. They think of
THE LAST DECADE

themselves, that is, as postulants for membership in a new, larger, and more complex community to which they are as yet extraneous. They conceive education, higher education, as the process of initiation into membership in that community.

And to conceive of education in this way is perhaps not to conceive of education as fully as might be, but surely it is not a mistaken conception: we who are concerned to discover what it is that, in the contemporary world, makes a truly educated person, cannot be greatly at odds with the view of the matter taken by those members of the urban working class whom Sennett interviewed. If we consider, for instance, that the word initiation carries archaic and "primitive" overtones, bringing to mind tribal procedures and mystery cults, we may suppose that a great deal of what we will say in the discussion of our subject will disclose our assumption that the educated person is exactly an initiate who began as a postulant, passed to a higher level of experience, and became worthy of admission into the company of those who are thought to have transcended the mental darkness and inertia in which they were previously immersed. This assumption has always existed somewhere in the traditional humanistic ideal of education.

But if, following Sennett's lead, I suggest that there is an affinity between the way in which higher education is conceived by traditional humanism and the way in which it is conceived, instinctually as it were, by a significant group of uneducated people who want to be educated, have I not in effect said that the educational ideal of traditional humanism can count upon being ceaselessly sustained and renewed? And if I have done that, then how can I maintain the opinion expressed at the beginning of this paper, that there is but little likelihood that in our time there will be articulated in a convincing and effectual way an educational ideal that has a positive connection with the humanistic educational traditions of the past?

I have used the word initiation to suggest the ritually prescribed stages by which a person is brought into a community whose members are presumed to have attained to a state of being superior to his own. Such ritual procedures typically involve a test, which, by reason of its difficulty or danger or pain or hardship, is commonly called an ordeal. It is from this exigent experience that the process of initiation is thought to derive its validity. The ordeal is presumed to bring about a change in the postulant, a state of illumination and power. In the German word for education, Bildung, a word which is almost comically notorious for the multiplicity of its meanings, which make it the despair of translators, both the idea of initiation and the idea of the ordeal are among its significations. Hegel, for example, speaks of Bildung as a "terrible discipline" by which mankind is shaped toward its higher next stage of existence. It is of course true that Bildung can mean gentle and gradual things, such as development, growth, generation, and achieved things, such as structure and organisation, and, going beyond these, cultivation, culture, civilization, but it also means fashioning, forming, shaping, and it means as well the state of being fashioned, being formed, being shaped, which, in the making of a human being, as in the making of a Tyger, if Blake is telling the truth, are processes in which there is a fashioner, a former, a shaper, who puts forth strenuous effort against the recalcitrance of the material he is dealing with, and that the material—which is to say the person—submits to being dealt with, consents to undergo the ordeal of being fashioned, formed, shaped.

If I am right in saying that humanistic educational traditions of the past were grounded in strenuous effort and that the idea of ordeal was essential to them, it will be obvious, I think, that our American culture will not find these educational traditions congenial. Perhaps other national cultures still follow their own traditions in being less distressed than ours by what the humanistic education of the past entailed in the way of strict sanction and required submission. In England, for example, pupil is still not a compromised word as it is in this country. The English use it quite neutrally except perhaps where it carries subtle overtones of celebration, as when an established scholar refers to the distinguished man who was his tutor.
Uncertain Future of Humanistic Educational Ideal

wide agreement that this is not how our primary and secondary schools understand their function. But might it not be a question whether, in the light of precisely our most conscientiously forward-looking and hopeful cultural sentiment, there is any real need for them to regard their function in this way? Consider the following estimate of young people who have entered the universities after having had the presumably inadequate training our schools give: "The present generation of young people in our universities are the best informed, the most intelligent, and the most idealistic this country has ever known. This is the experience of teachers everywhere." I am citing the opening paragraph of the Report of the Fact-Finding Commission Appointed to Investigate the Disturbances at Columbia University in April and May 1968. It was written by the chairman of the commission, Professor Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law School. The statement, we may presume, was not carelessly made.

Although when I first read Professor Cox’s statement my response was one of natural bewilderment, upon further consideration perhaps I have come to see how Professor Cox arrived at this remarkable judgment. Ours is a culture of which a chief characteristic is its self-awareness. Not only that aspect of our culture which we refer to as “high” is largely given over to enhancing this alertness to our condition—no less intense and overt in this effort is what we might call the institutional-popular sector of our culture, which includes advertising, television in its various genres, journalism in its various modes. Through the agency of one segment of the culture or another, there is unceasingly being borne in upon us the consciousness that we live in circumstances of an unprecedented sort. And through these agencies we are provided with the information and the attitudes that enable us to believe not only that we can properly identify the difficulties presented by the society but also that we can cope with them, at least in spirit, and that in itself our consciousness of difficulties to be coped with gives us moral distinction. The young share with their elders this alertness to our condition; and the consciousness, together with the moral validation it confers, appears in

at the university by saying, "I was a pupil of So-and-so," which is to say, "He taught me; I learned from him." But, in America, an excellent handbook of linguistic usage tells us that one should not refer to anyone over the age of (I think) twelve as a pupil. To apply the word to a person who has passed the canonical age can only be considered derogatory in that it implies being taught or being required to learn, and thus denies the autonomy made manifest in the word student.

Very likely this feeling on the part of many Americans that being taught or required to learn is an arbitrary denial of autonomy goes far toward explaining the state of primary and secondary education in our country. Everyone seems to act as if that cause is wholly and irretrievably lost and to conclude that the best way of dealing with this significant defeat of the democratic ideal is to put it behind us, to say nothing more about it, and to place our hope for education wholly in its higher branches. At the several conferences and seminars that I have attended through the past year, all of which put their emphasis on the humanistic aspects of education, it was taken for granted that the effectual process of education begins at age eighteen, upon entrance into college; any questioning of this assumption, any attempt to suggest that the quality of higher education might have some relation to the quality of primary and secondary education was unfailingly met with irritated resistance as being an obstructive irrelevance. This would have greatly surprised—would have appalled—John Milton or any theorist of humanistic education of the past.

Yet will we be fair to our society if we let those old theorists of humanistic education have the last word? Will we be doing justice to our system of education in its totality if we take the view that we fail in our duty to our young people because we do not see to it that they are really taught, that they are really required to learn traditional substantive subjects, that they are early and compulsorily subjected to such fashioning, forming, shaping as will prepare them for further Bildung at the university? As I have said, there is pretty
the young at an increasingly early age, the rate of social and cultural maturation having radically accelerated in recent years, doubtless as a consequence of extreme alterations in the mores of the family and in the mores of sexuality. The excitement about the problems of our world (perhaps not the less heartily for being touched by apprehensiveness) and the emotions of mastery (perhaps not the less cherished for showing some color of factitiousness) that are so abundantly generated in our culture make a convincing simulacrum of a serious address to, and comprehension of, the society.

In his high estimate of the young, Professor Cox accepted the simulacrum for the real thing: he celebrated as knowledge and intelligence what in actuality is merely a congeries of "advanced" public attitudes. When he made his affirmation of the enlightenment of the young, he affirmed his own enlightenment and that of others who would agree with his judgment—for it is from the young and not from his own experience that he was deriving his values, and for values to have this source is, in the view of a large part of our forward-looking culture, all the certification that is required to prove that the values are sound ones. But surely more important than the deference to youth that was implicit in Professor Cox's high estimate of the attainment of this generation of students was his readiness to accept another of the master traits of our contemporary culture: its willingness—its eagerness—to forgo the particularization of conduct. Recognizing the great store now placed on selfhood and the energies of the self, Professor Cox met and matched the culture in its principled indifference to the intellectual and moral forms in which the self chooses to be presented.

If we consider the roadblocks in the path of a re-establishment of traditional humanistic education, surely none is so effectually obstructing as the tendency of our culture to regard the mere energy of impulse as being in every mental and moral way equivalent and even superior to defined intention. We may remark, as exemplary of this tendency, the fate of an idea that once was salient in Western culture: the idea of "making a life," by which was meant conceiving human existence, one's own or another's, as if it were a work of art upon which one might pass judgment, assessing it by established criteria. This idea of a conceived and executed life is a very old one and was in force until relatively recently; we regard it as characteristic of the Victorian age, but it of course lasted even longer than that. It was what virtually all novels used to be about: how you were born, reared, and shaped, and then how you took over and managed for yourself as best you could. And cognate with the idea of making a life, a nicely proportioned one, with a beginning, a middle, and an end, was the idea of making a self, a good self. Yeats speaks of women dealing with their outward selves as works of art, laboring to be beautiful; just so does Castiglione in The Book of the Courtier represent men laboring to come up to standard, to be all that men might reasonably hope to be, partly for the satisfaction of being so, partly for the discharge of rather primitive political functions.

This desire to fashion, to shape, a self and a life has all but gone from a contemporary culture whose emphasis, paradoxically enough, is so much on self. If we ask why this has come about, the answer of course involves us in a giant labor of social history. But there is one reason which can be readily isolated and which, I think, explains much. It is this: if you set yourself to shaping a self, a life, you limit yourself to that self and that life. You preclude any other kind of selfhood remaining available to you. You close out other options, other possibilities which might have been yours. Such limitation, once acceptable, now goes against the cultural grain—it is almost as if the fluidity of the contemporary world demands an analogous limitlessness in our personal perspective. Any doctrine, that of the family, religion, the school, that does not sustain this increasingly felt need for a multiplicity of options and instead offers an ideal of a shaped self, a formed life, has the sign on it of a retrograde and depriving authority, which, it is felt, must be resisted.

For anyone concerned with contemporary education at whatever level, the assimilation that contemporary culture has made between social idealism, even political liberalism, and personal fluidity—a self
without the old confinements—is as momentous as it is recalcitrant to correction. Among the factors in the contemporary world which militate against the formulation of an educational ideal related to the humanistic traditions of the past, this seems to me to be the most decisive.

**The Freud/Jung Letters**


**THE relationship between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung had its bright beginning in 1906 and came to its emblazoned end in 1913. Its disastrous course was charted by the many letters the two men wrote each other. Of these a few have been lost but there are 360 extant, of which 164 are from Freud, 196 from Jung. In 1970 the Freud and Jung families made the enlightened decision that this correspondence was to be edited as a unit, and it is now published, simultaneously in German and in English. In no way does it disappoint the large expectation it has naturally aroused. Both as it bears upon the personal lives of the men between whom the letters passed and upon the intellectual history of our epoch, it is a document of inestimable importance.**

In 1906 Freud was 50 years old, by no means an anonymous figure in psychiatry but far from content with the acceptance that had so far been accorded his ideas. Jung was 31, already well established in his profession, second in command at the widely-known psychiatric hospital at Zürich, the Burghölzli, whose chief was the redoubtable Eugen Bleuler. The relationship began with Jung's sending Freud a copy of a volume of studies he had supervised in which the importance of psychoanalysis was handsomely acknowled-