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Emails from Lt. Josh Arthur

Initial Impressions from Baghdad

Saturday, November 25, 2006

All,

Greetings once again. By now you're probably starting to wonder just what kind of shady "deployment" this is, what with my updates and e-mails more often than even I expected. All the same, I thought you might like to know what our part of Baghdad brings to mind so far.

My unit is working primarily in the neighborhoods of Khadra and Ameriyah. Find Baghdad International Airport on a map, and we're in the first built-up areas just to its east and northeast (in western Baghdad, on the whole; the opposite side of the city from Sadr City). The area we operate in is mostly Sunni - almost exclusively Sunni, in fact. The neighborhoods were once somewhat more mixed, with perhaps as high as a 70/30 - Sunni/Shia blend at one point. Particularly as a result of the recent sectarian violence you've probably heard much about, though, Shias are either leaving the area voluntarily or leaving this world vary INvoluntarily. The stories in the media of sectarian violence are absolutely true, and they probably aren't overstated, no matter what you're hearing. Don't think there are armed militias waging pitched gunfights in the middle of the streets every day; that's not the case (actually, it's rarely the case). By far the most common situation to which we respond, though, is indeed the finding of dead bodies in our area. In but a handful of patrols already, I've come upon three. Two had been bound and/or blindfolded; the third had been the victim of an alleged drive-by shooting that happened just moments before (we arrived on scene as a result of our responding to the gunfire). Nearly all of the bodies found are of Shia victims, and most bodies show evidence of having been killed execution-style, with gunshots to the back of the head and neck.

It's generally about as gruesome as it sounds; thank goodness we've so far been spared the spate of beheadings that ravaged the area not long before our arrival. But the manner of death isn't as important as the motive, which in almost all cases is reprisal and intimidation, as best we can tell. Bodies are left in conspicuous areas - in open fields near mosques, on heavily trafficked corners, or simply in sites that have since come to be known as places to expect to find bodies. Sometimes they're there simply as a show of force or power; other times they're acts of revenge for incidents perpetrated by the other sect. It's human tragedy of a senseless and, I think to most of us, a basically incomprehensible kind. As I said, this is far and away the most common incident of note to which we respond or happen to encounter.

It's probably fair to say that Iraqis are targeting each other more than they are American forces these days, though that's little consolation to the families who are, without a doubt, still losing soldiers each day. Even groups more committed to violence against the other religious sect generally aren't exactly averse to taking out an American and killing two birds with one stone. IEDs are the most common and, generally, the most feared threat from the insurgents and Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF). AIF are adaptable, they're smart, and though they may not have the most sophisticated technology, they exploit what they have to its deadliest potential.

They watch American patrols and learn about our techniques and about our vehicles; they study their effective attacks from the past; they analyze their tactics and are constantly shifting them to try to stay one step ahead of us. Interestingly, it's generally rare these days to find tactics that are completely new, ; many AIF groups have simply begun to revert to prior tricks from their grab-bag to see if they'll work now that we expect something else (more often than not, they don't). We, of course, have systems and techniques to defeat or avoid many IED attacks, and we're finally getting ahead of AIF in some respects, but this is their home and they'll probably always have an advantage. As I said, IEDs are probably the most widely feared threat, mostly because of their unpredictability. The only mitigating factor is that knowledge that an IED sizable enough to destroy an up-armored HMMWV, let alone anything bigger, must be very large indeed. Aggressive patrolling and a constant presence do a great deal to diminish the threat.

The scarier if more localized fear is the emerging frequency of sniper attacks. It's probably fair to say that the sniper has been a fear for every soldier in every conflict who had a chance of encountering one. They're able to hide, they're able to select their shot, and - most dangerously - they can shoot! There's actually strong suspicion that some of the attacks are being carried out by a Chechen mercenary of sorts; whether that's founded is beyond me. But it's always a scary thought to think that someone, somewhere, is waiting for you outside of your vehicle.

It's particularly difficult with infantrymen who, by their training, feel more comfortable on the ground. It's what they see their role as, and it's how leaders have been taught to employ them. Infantrymen have no particular desire to stay cooped up in a vehicle for hours at a time (though they do it without complaint, since they know it makes them safer). The sniper threat is not the primary one; there are only so many snipers, and there are only so many opportunities that lend themselves to a sniper attack (avoiding those in the first place, of course, is the best way to beat it). Still, it's on most guys' minds, and that's probably the hoped-for effect overall by those coordinating the attacks. (More general small arms fire, as opposed to precision sniper fire, is seen by soldiers not so much as a threat but as an opportunity, interestingly enough. If they're going to be dumb enough to shoot at us, the average soldier thinks, well heck, at least we have the chance to shoot back!)

Now that I've gone and talked about nothing but the dangers of the area, let me make clear that no soldier here (including me) feels like he's in imminent danger every minute of every patrol. Certain areas may make the hair on the back of your neck stand up, as may certain situations, but it would be misleading to think soldiers leave the FOB every day with paralyzing fear. It's unhealthy not to be wary, but most of the time it's not even an issue. We obviously try to avoid situations that are patently dangerous.

We do a large number of patrols in conjunction with different Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). My platoon in particular works with a unit of the National Police, one of three main security forces (the others are the Iraqi Police, IP, and the Iraqi Army, IA). Of the three, the National police is the most homegrown, least professional, and most poorly trained. The sense I get is that of a citizens' militia of sorts; of regular joes who have volunteered to be armed policemen. They wear an interesting variety of military-inspired uniforms, and they have various personal weapons ranging from inconspicuous, shabby sidearms to nickel-plated AK-47s. They are a motley crew if ever I have seen one, without a doubt. They patrol in pickup trucks with extra sheet metal welded onto the sides, with gunners kind of standing up in the bed of the truck with a machine gun. It would be a comedy of errors if their jobs weren't very deadly serious. I don't mean that they are indispensably important; just that it would be wrong to mock their contributions when they, too, are the target of many attacks. As I said, the Iraqis dislike each other as much as they dislike us. The NP and IA checkpoints are frequent targets of vehicle-borne IEDs, and the volunteers are putting their lives on the line in doing a relatively thankless job. At the NP level (not so much IA), corruption and the good old boy system seem to the norm, according to everything we've learned from the outgoing units. It's easy to view them as inferior because of their dubious loyalty and mediocre ability, but their sacrifice is the same.

The only other particularly notable thing about our entire area of operations, I would say - and indeed, from what I understand, from all of Baghdad, is the massive amount of trash. Everywhere. If you've never seen the slums of a foreign country, I don't think you could possibly imagine how absurd it is. Even run-down areas of American cities are nowhere near - just nothing at all like - the littered streets of our areas. Parts of our area are and/or were the locations of the homes of many senior government officials under Saddam's regime; many professionals still inhabit the area, and yet the place is still filthy. I can't think of a more descriptive word to use. Medians are covered with trash; you literally cannot see the dirt beneath for many dozens or hundreds of meters at a time, and when you can it's usually because there's an intersection. The prior unit took part in an operation that, among other things, cleaned up all the trash in the neighborhood, and within just months it's all returned. It's a mess, and it gives you the worrying impression that maybe we care more about Iraq than its own citizens? I obviously can't make that statement based solely on the amount of trash, but it seems to me an indicator of a mindset that might not be the healthiest for progressive reform. Just one man's opinion.

With that I'll take my leave, though, and bid you all farewell. I hope your Thanksgiving was enjoyable; the dinner here was somewhat lackluster (no mashed potatoes or cranberry sauce - on Thanksgiving!), but the effort was commendable. I was happy just to eat after my patrol. But I hope you're all well, and in case you don't hear from me for a few weeks, I'd be remiss if I didn't offer those four very important final words before I go:

GO ARMY! BEAT NAVY!

Love to all,
Josh

 

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